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 Abstract 
 
Since much of the focus on large-scale land acquisitions is predominantly political and ideological, 
different models and practices embedded in the phenomenon and, by consequence the diverse 
implications they imply, tend to be overlooked. This is supported by the use of the term “land 
grabbing”: while it implies large differences in forms of organization of the production, investment 
processes and outcomes these land deals might take, the existing body of literature misses the 
economic and institutional nuances of investment models embedded in “land grabbing”. The 
objective of this paper is to present the diversity of investment models implemented in Southern 
Africa and to analyze their differentiated implications in the framework of the region’s broader 
agrarian trajectories. Based on intensive empirical research in Southern Africa and using a theoretical 
framework based on institutional economics (focusing on the institutionalized forms of agricultural 
production, the investment implementation processes and the extent of the implications), the results 
show that beyond the classical institutionalized forms of agricultural production (independent 
commercial farming, estate farming) new investment and production models are developing in the 
region. Six models with several sub-models have been identified: independent farmers (independent 
farmers, delocalized auxiliary farm model, Resource pooling farmers), cooperative, 1,000-day 
speculative, asset management, contracting (nucleus-estate, reverse tenancy, ingrower schemes) 
and agribusiness models. Besides the lack of inclusive business models, another important 
commonality of these models is the high failure of the investments – unless strongly integrated 
structures and value-chains are developed – leading to the establishment of few corporate 
structures. The paper reflects on Southern Africa’s agrarian transformations, which, although not 
broad-based, are mainly characterized by the imposition of a dominant corporate-based paradigm. 
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1 Introduction – The need for disaggregated analyses of the large-scale land 
acquisition phenomenon 
Despite an extensive literature, most analyses of large-scale land acquisitions are politically and 
ideologically anchored, reflecting strong opposing stances. On one hand, proponents of large-scale 
land acquisitions argue that poor countries could benefit from foreign direct investment in land, 
particularly through the creation of on- and off-farm jobs, technology transfer in production and 
processing, infrastructure development and improvement of basic services access (Deininger et al. 
2011). They support the development of codes of conduct, guidelines and principles of responsible 
investment based on corporate social responsibility (Deininger et al. 2011) as strategies to regulate 
these transactions and overcome non-equitable, non-transparent and non-sustainable investments. 
On the other hand, opponents argue that large-scale land acquisitions are basically a contemporary 
revival of neo-colonialism, jeopardizing poor peasants’ livelihoods. According to them, the above 
mentioned principles, guidelines and codes of conduct, besides being voluntary and thus not 
enforceable, present instruments based on ideological assumptions related to the existence of 
“reserve agricultural land” and the accountability of the stakeholders is highly questionable (Borras 
et al. 2010). They criticize the depoliticized vision of partnerships and contractual arrangements and 
the lack of integration of the politics of land governance inherent to such measures (Zoomers 2010). 
 
Although opposed, a common point of these two fractions is the overall use of generalizing terms 
such as ‘land grab’ by the opponents or ‘land-based investments’ by the proponents. Indeed, the 
ideologized debate tends to overlook the existing economic and institutional nuances and, 
subsequently, the different implications of the large-scale land acquisition phenomenon, while it 
implies large differences that inform the organization of production, investment processes and 
outcomes of these land deals. Related to the latter, the mainly economic (Cochet et al. 2011), 
environmental (Woodhouse 2012) and social (McCarthy 2010, Nhantumbo et al. 2010) analyses 
informing these stances, generally remain at a case study level, without contextualizing these 
acquisitions in the context of broader socio-economic transformations (Borras et al. 2012). 
 
This paper will try to shed light on these nuances by exploring the diverse nature, strategies and 
business and investment models implemented by investors, including their differentiated 
evolutionary dynamics and implications in terms of agricultural development and agrarian change. 
Indeed, there is a need to better understand, besides other aspects, how the different large-scale 
land acquisition projects are structured, which business models they are based on and how they are 
implemented. We intend thus to go beyond both the above presented generalizations and analytical 
dichotomy, by taking into consideration a series of changing contexts and emergent processes and 
forces that are producing new conditions and are facilitating shifts in both de jure and de facto land 
control (Peluso et al. 2011). As such, based on extensive empirical fieldwork, a typology of the 
agricultural investment models implemented in Southern Africa will be presented and analyzed, and 
will complement a first attempt, by Borras et al. (2012), to define and theorize the phenomenon 
taking into consideration emerging dynamics of changes in land use and property relations.  
 
The next section of the paper will present and justify the theoretical and methodological frameworks 
implemented in order to analyze the diversity of large-scale land acquisition models, their 
implementation and implications. The models will be detailed in section three. This presentation will 
be complemented by analytical reflections regarding the outcomes, the inclusiveness and the 
trajectories of the different typologies identified. The concluding section re-contextualizes the large-
scale land acquisition phenomenon and reflects on their broader implications regarding agricultural 
development and transformation of Southern Africa’s agrarian societies.  
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2 A socio-institutional approach to analyzing large-scale land acquisitions 
Although the extensive literature tends to present an indiscriminate and thus simplified image of the 
large-scale land acquisition phenomenon, several differentiating elements have already been 
analyzed emphasizing the often complex nature of the phenomenon. Recent studies have 
emphasized the differences related to the sectors and drivers of the acquisitions (Cotula 2012), the 
countries of origin, nature (public or private) and type (agribusiness companies, investment funds, 
sovereign funds) of investors (Anseeuw et al. 2012). Others’ empirical works have highlighted the 
complexity of the processes implemented. Besides describing contractual arrangements for land 
deals in Africa (Vermeulen et al. 2010), Burnod et al. (2013) show, in the case of Madagascar, how 
intermediary persons or entities are structured while O’Brien (2011) analyses the engagement of 
national elites in order to acquire land in Kenya. Other studies focus on a specific type of actors, such 
as Buxton et al. (2012) and Ducastel et al. (2013) who detail the institutional set-up between capital 
and (often subordinated) implementing entities. In addition, as shown by the analysis of the Land 
Matrix data, engagements and strategies are dynamic and can change rapidly. The latter is mainly 
related to the nature of the activities and strategies of the investors, as well as to the risky 
environments in which these investments take place. In many cases, large-scale land acquisitions are 
not the initiative of single investors, engaging only one country, but are complex constructions 
engaging a multiplicity of actors and nationalities across multiple countries. 
 
In order to take into consideration this diversity, complexity and dynamics, an approach based on 
“hybrid forms of organizations” developed by Williamson (1991) and remodeled by Ménard (2004) 
was adopted. Menard defines the variety of hybrids as “a diversity of agreements among legally 
autonomous entities doing business together, mutually adjusting with little help from the price 
system, and sharing or exchanging technologies, capital, products, and services, but without a unified 
ownership” (2004, p348). It results in a diversity of complex forms of organization of production, 
characterized by three criteria: i) pooling of resources (all hybrids are oriented towards coordination 
and cooperation of different firms or independent actors); ii) contracting and governance structure, 
in which there is always a form – more or less formal – of contract between the different 
stakeholders involved in the hybrid; and iii) competition. The shaping of a particular arrangement is 
always somehow the result of competitive pressures (within the hybrid between partners and 
competition with other arrangements) (Ménard 2004). 
 
A second reference is made to the academic work by Vermeulen et al. (2010) focusing on the 
inclusiveness of the form of production and investment model. According to the authors, there are 
three ways of distinguishing the inclusiveness of agricultural business models: i) the match between 
the landholder and the day-to-day manager of operations; ii) the degree of vertical integration in the 
value chain; and iii) the relevance to different stages of the value chain, from producer through to 
consumer.1 The assessment of the inclusiveness is then done according to four different criteria: i) 
ownership of the business (equity shares) and of key assets such as land and processing facilities; ii) 
voice (the ability to influence key business decisions, including weight in decision making, 
arrangements for review and grievance, and mechanisms for dealing with asymmetries in 
information access); iii) risk, including commercial, production, supply and market risks, but also 
wider risks such as political and reputational risks; and iv) reward (the sharing of economic costs and 
benefits, including price setting and finance arrangements).  
 
Based on both the theoretical frameworks and the specificities of the project and the situations on 
the ground, three categories of variables were used to build a typology of investment models.  
1 According to these three aspects, Cotula and Vermeulen (2010) identified six inclusive business models: 
contract farming, management contracts, tenant farming and sharecropping, joint ventures, farm-owned 
businesses, and upstream and downstream business links. 
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First, the set-up and organizational characteristics of the model: the form of organization 
of production and the governance structure implemented by the partners, with special 
attention to coordination patterns and level of integration. 
Second, the results, outcome and sustainability of the models: the varied purposes of land 
acquisitions and, as a result of the models, their varied levels of sustainability. 
Third, inclusiveness and the direct implications for local populations and development: 
whether and in what ways the different models contribute to (local) development and 
integrate local populations. 
 
Due to the sensitivity of the topic, which is mainly related to the non-transparency of certain deals, 
the lack of knowledge regarding these activities and the negative press surrounding the latter, access 
to information – particularly regarding investors and their investment models – is often complex. 
Two original and strategic methods and partnerships had to be established to overcome this 
difficulty. A first one was characterized by collaborative projects with the Nepad Business Foundation 
and the Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions (SACAU) (both of which have major 
investors in the region – such as Agri-SA, the South African Commercial Farmers’ Union – as their 
members), assessing successful large-scale investments and supporting the development of 
instruments facilitating the inclusion of smallholder farmers into commercial enterprises. This 
methodology, implemented in Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi and the Republic of Congo, facilitated 
our ability to approach investors. A second one involved a long-term hosting position within strategic 
Ministries, enabling the establishment of a participatory research methodology. Implemented in 
Mozambique, with the National Directorate for the Promotion of Rural Development (DNPDR),2 it 
allowed us to participate in meetings with host country officials involved in negotiations at all levels 
regarding the land investment issue, focus group interviews with local community members affected 
by investments as well as facilitating access to official data on large scale agricultural projects and 
land rights applications. During the different fieldwork missions (March 2012 - June 2013), 33 
projects were assessed (29 in Mozambique, 3 in Zambia, 1 in the Republic of Congo) through the 
implementation of over a hundred semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders (farmers, 
investors and agribusiness representatives, host country officials, local community members and 
experts). In addition, many other examples from the literature or known from other 
projects/discussions will complement the empirical results presented in this paper. 
 
3 A large spectrum of large-scale land acquisition models 
According to the outline and methodology detailed above, six models of large-scale land acquisitions 
are identified. At the two extremes, according to the degree of integration, more traditional setups 
are found: the independent farming model and the agribusiness-estate model. In between, a number 
of novel hybrid forms are developing – mainly as an adaptation strategy to a relatively new 
agricultural environment and market constraints. The latter are: the cooperative model, the 
speculative 1,000-day model, the asset management model and, finally, the contracting model (Table 
1). In addition, several of these models, depending on the prominence of certain intrinsic 
characteristics or of how they adapt and evolve, can present variants such as the associative variants 
of the independent one or the nucleus-estate, the reverse tenancy and the “ingrower scheme” 
submodels associated with the contracting model. 
2 A long-term relationship has been developed in Mozambique with the National Directorate for the Promotion 
of Rural Development (DNPDR) linked to the Ministry of State Administration. Within the National Directorate’s 
“Land and Natural Resources Programme”, a project entitled PRO Parcerias aims at creating inclusive and 
sustainable partnerships between local communities and agricultural investors. This relationship resulted in the 
hosting of one of the authors during the project’s fieldwork in Mozambique within the PRO Parcerias program,  
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Table 1: The Different Large-Scale Land Acquisition Models 
Models Independent 
farmer 
model 
Cooperativ
e farmer 
model 
Speculative 
1,000-day 
model 
Asset 
manageme
nt model 
Contracting 
model 
Agribusine
ss Estate 
model 
Variants and Sub-models 
 -Independent 
farmers 
-Delocalized 
auxiliary 
farming model 
-Resource 
pooling 
farmers 
Cooperativ
e farmer 
model 
1000-day 
model 
Asset 
manageme
nt model 
-Contract 
farming 
-Nucleus 
Estate 
-Reverse 
Tenancy 
-Ingrower 
scheme 
Agribusine
ss Model 
Set up and organization 
Mechanisms 
of 
Governance 
Independent 
Cooperativ
e 
(hybrid) 
Financial 
corporate 
(hybrid) 
Financial 
corporate 
(hybrid) 
Processing 
corporate 
(hybrid) 
Agribusine
ss 
(corporate
) 
Actors 
involved 
Independent 
farmer and 
some informal 
groupings 
Union, 
cooperativ
e, farmers, 
Developer/
consultant, 
financer 
Asset 
managemen
t company, 
financer 
Agribusiness 
already 
established 
and local 
farmers 
Agribusine
ss 
Investment 
(structure) 
Independent 
funds 
Investment 
secured by 
the 
cooperativ
e 
Private 
equity 
partner 
Private 
equity 
partner 
Agribusiness Agribusine
ss 
Average size 
of the 
project 
<1,000 ha 10,000 – 
80,000 ha 
5,000-
10,000 ha 
5,000-
10,000 ha 
> 5,000 ha > 10,000 
ha 
Establishme
nt/Access to 
land 
Implementatio
n started at 
local level 
Bilateral 
treaty; 
Top down 
decision 
process 
 
Acquisition 
of old state 
farms 
facilitated 
by political 
network 
Takeover of 
old state 
farms; 
Expansion 
on 
surrounding 
area 
Already 
established 
agribusiness
; 
Support 
from donors 
to identify 
outgrowers 
and secure 
land access 
Centralize
d decision; 
Top down 
decision 
process; 
Takeover 
of failed 
projects 
Contracting/ 
agreement 
No contracting National 
bilateral 
agreement
s; 
Farmers 
with 
cooperativ
e 
Too early 
or for 
prospective 
purposes 
Possible off-
set 
contracts 
(transport, 
logistic, 
value chain 
service 
providers) 
Production 
and 
marketing 
contracts 
National 
bilateral 
agreement
s; 
Possible 
off-set 
contracts 
(land 
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clearing 
and 
transport) 
-Degree of 
vertical 
integration 
Little Little Relatively high 
Relatively 
high to High High 
Total 
vertical 
integratio
n 
Result, outcome, sustainability 
Mechanisms 
for Sharing 
rent 
N/A Cooperativ
e – salaries 
and paid 
out to 
cooperativ
e members 
Dividend 
on margin 
made 
Shares of 
the asset 
managemen
t company 
Depending 
on the 
contract 
N/A as 
integrated 
Outcome 
Farming 
production 
Farming 
production; 
Transfer of 
technology; 
Geopolitica
l influence 
Farming 
infrastructu
re;  
ROI for 
financer 
Farming 
production;  
ROI for 
financer 
Farming 
production 
and 
processing 
Farming, 
processing 
Level of 
failure High 
Too early 
or for 
prospective 
purposes 
High Relatively High Low Low 
Inclusiveness and national/local development 
Ownership/ 
Voice/ 
Risk/Reward 
into core 
activities 
Mentorship 
within 
informal 
grouping 
None None None Contract 
farming, 
nucleus 
Estate 
managemen
t contract 
Developm
ent as 
“enclave 
economy” 
Local 
benefits 
Land taxes;  
Labor 
intensive 
model; 
Some 
collective 
action with 
local emergent 
farmers 
Land taxes; 
Labor 
intensive 
production 
model 
 
None Land taxes  
Employmen
t creation 
volatile 
Land taxes; 
Productive 
uplifting and 
market 
access; 
Labor 
intensive 
production 
model 
Land 
taxes; 
Compensa
tion;  
Highly 
mechanize
d 
productio
n model 
 
3.1 Independent Farmers 
This model is based on the establishment of large independent family farms, mainly based on South 
Africa’s commercial farm model. Found in every Southern African country, certain countries seem to 
be more appealing to this type of investors than others. For example, Madagascar calls for a large 
number of independent French investors (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2011) whereas 
Mozambique and Zambia, among others, attract significant numbers of South African (up to 800 in 
Mozambique and 300 in Zambia according to informal sources) as well as Zimbabwean (Hammar 
2010) and Portuguese farmers (particularly in Mozambique). On the other hand, the independent 
farmer model tends not to be favored in the Republic of Congo, for example.  
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* Set-up and organizational characteristics of the model 
 
Some common specific characteristics should be emphasized for this model. Firstly, land is acquired 
at the local level, often negotiated through local authorities. The areas acquired vary from a few 
hundred hectares to few thousand hectares (generally less than 2,000 ha). Secondly, these farmers 
develop their activities independently, bearing the production costs and risks. As such, these farmers 
focus mainly on basic market production, going for the more profitable market opportunities, 
whether they are domestic or international.3 Thirdly, the investment capital originates mainly from 
previous savings or still on-going activities (mainly in the home country). This is related to the major 
difficulties these farmers face in accessing financial services. On one hand, financial services are in 
most Southern African countries not well established, in particular for agricultural and foreign 
initiatives, with high interest-rate loans (23% in Mozambique for example) often being the only 
financial service available. On the other hand, few of these ‘new’ independent farmers have a well-
developed track record in the countries where they are planning to develop their activities, leading 
to banks – in both their home or hosting countries – not willing to provide working capital for these 
projects. Lastly, they engage in various production patterns, although mostly in fruits (mango, 
banana, citrus), tobacco, soy and cattle. A common characteristic is the focus on high value-added 
commodities produced according to labor-intensive farming systems.  
 
* Results, outcomes and sustainability 
 
There are few successful farmers in this model; most of them are struggling to establish themselves. 
A large share of them tried to access land, few succeed and manage to start their production, even 
fewer manage to continue on a long-term basis. The technical difficulties and institutional 
uncertainties are major factors for failure. In Mozambique for example, the only projects that are 
successful, at least at the time of the survey, are those with higher value-added production. RDI Ltd 
(litchis and potatoes, Sussundenga), AgriZA (bananas, Manica), Phoenix Farm (tobacco, soy seeds and 
maize seeds, Vanduzi) and GETT (intensive poultry production, Nampula) are some examples. 
Production of low value-added commodities (such as grain) seems not suitable, particularly when 
farmers are not integrated into specific value chains. 
 
In order to overcome some of the obstacles encountered, these independent farmers adapt. As such, 
variants, based on institutional innovations mushrooming from the independent farmers’ model, are 
appearing. They mainly consist of farmers establishing two types of associations or informal 
groupings:  
 
Farmers setting up an auxiliary farming activity, as an extension of farming activities in their 
home countries. This set-up allows for the newly settled entity in the host country to 
benefit from continuous financial support (avoiding the dependence on host country loans 
or alleviating the financial pressure related to the long – often unproductive and thus costly 
– settlement period), but also from technological and stock transfers, developed market 
channels, etc. Although a focus might be to conquer host country markets, a major 
difference with the independent farmers is their export-orientation as they benefit from 
the already established markets and structures. 
 
3 In the majority of the cases, farmers tend to produce for domestic markets as, compared to foreign ones, 
demand is often high, prices received are often above international prices (as domestic prices are based on 
international imports for a large majority of produce) and transaction costs (particularly transport) are lower. In 
some cases transportation costs are too high a barrier of entry, preventing these farmers from exporting. 
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Farmers affected by the aforementioned obstacles tend to group themselves into 
associations in order to pool resources or benefit from economies of scale.  Although the 
production itself remains independent (in all cases identified through the study), pooling of 
resources and working equipment leads to a significant decrease of establishment and 
transaction costs. It enables the farmers to reach production volumes and standards that 
allow them to reach economic viability thresholds and facilitate the development of input 
and output markets (often through contractual arrangements). 
 
These associations are not only more stable compared to the independent farmers, they also 
structure the less-established agricultural sectors and value-chains through collective actions. They 
do so through organizing agriculture (farmers organizations, etc.), as well as by opening up markets. 
In the Manica province in Mozambique, foreign independent farmers and domestic emergent 
farmers have formed the FrutiCentro association. Lobbying together local authorities, they mainly 
endeavor to reach certain production volumes facilitating them to negotiate contractual 
arrangements with input suppliers and off-takers (often coming from far-off major urban centers 
such as Maputo or Beira).  
 
* Inclusiveness and local/national development 
 
Overall the independent farmer model, by nature, shows little inclusiveness with domestic farmers. 
Even in the case of the more associative variants, these informal groupings generally occur as 
autonomous and independent clusters, mainly gathering foreigners, with little interaction with local 
dynamics. This is also the case regarding associations with local farmers. They remain often elitist, 
only including better-off emergent farmers who are not representative of the majority. The 
FrutiCentro case is an example of the latter. 
 
In addition, as most of these farmers are struggling, many of the potential benefits for the local 
communities are the first to be jeopardized. Very few permanent jobs are being created, with most 
of the jobs being seasonal, monthly or even daily. Even if the farming systems implemented are often 
labor intensive, the smaller scale and the seasonal nature of the operations imply a limited impact 
for local populations.4 Moreover, their geographical dispersion and the relatively small size of these 
investments are the main reason explaining their minimal leverage on broader developments such as 
infrastructure or social measures. In general, the benefit is a once-off compensation for the use of 
land and, depending on the national law, a yearly land use tax. Finally, since it concerns rather 
smaller pieces of land, access to land is often acquired through local (regional or provincial) 
authorities with few formal enforcement measures in place, contributing as such to non-
transparency. 
 
3.2 Cooperative model 
A further institutional innovation of agricultural investment models observed in Southern Africa is 
the establishment of cooperative farmers’ structures facilitating the development of farming 
operations in the host country. As demonstrated in the Figure 1, this cooperative model is often 
based on multi-level governance structures varying from agricultural unions, established in the 
country of origin and developing activities abroad, to the development of farmer cooperatives and 
the establishment of farmers with collective and individual operations in the host countries. Analyzed 
examples of this model are Congo-Agriculture in the Republic of Congo and AgriSA-Moz in 
Mozambique, both engaging South African farmers. 
4 For example, on the 75 ha of tobacco production of one of the independent farmers interviewed around 
Chimoio (Manica, Mozambique), the average labor intensity is 1.13 workers/ha, varying from 0.08 workers/ha 
during the dry season up to 2 workers/ha in the peak of the rainy season. 
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* Set-up and organizational characteristics of the model 
 
These cooperative structures engage in several activities: 
 
o Representing the interests of the farmers engaged abroad; 
o Negotiating with national authorities on behalf of the farmers in order to obtain access 
to land and benefit from certain advantages (level of tax, insurance, support for 
infrastructure development, import/export benefits, etc.); 
o Establish and support the productive base (cooperative set-up, i.e. screen farmers, 
coordinate farmers, secure funding, empower members technically and institutionally, 
etc.) 
 
On average, the total area concerned depends on the number of farmers involved but generally 
covers several tens of thousands of hectares (10,000 ha-80,000 ha). 
 
The cooperative structure is the basis for many elements related to the development of a sustainable 
farming enterprise (Box 1). The financial resources come from a loan made available by an institution 
in the home country. The latter is made possible as the loan was taken on collectively by the 
cooperative structure, backed by the mother union and internationally. The initial loan is used 
exclusively for cooperative elements, such as overall infrastructural development and common 
farming activities. Secondly, the cooperative structure facilitated contractual arrangements for the 
off-take of the production, through its government contacts, the identification of off-takers, but also 
through its negotiation power with the third parties and the creation of a collective brand for 
commercialization (Favrot 2012). The cooperative also plays a major role in the legal set up of the 
model, negotiating a bilateral investment treaty. In the case of Congo Agriculture, one of the first 
steps was the signature of a bilateral investment treaty between South African and Congolese 
authorities in May 2010 (Hall 2012). 
 
Agricultural 
operations 
Infrastructure & maintenance 
(road, storage, mills) 
Social & community 
development (clinic, school) 
Farmers with collective and individual operations 
Farmer cooperative Farmer cooperative 
Partners in the origin 
country: 
- Logistical aspects 
- Legal representative 
- Import/Export partners 
Agricultural 
Union  
Partners in the host country: 
- Ministry of Agriculture 
(national and local level) 
- Diplomacy of origin 
 
Figure 1: Governance structure of the Cooperative Model 
Source: Congo Agriculture (2012) 
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* Results, outcomes and sustainability 
 
The institutional and productive bases of these set-ups are relatively stable, mainly due to bilateral 
agreements, and far-reaching and multi-level negotiations and engagements on the ground. In 
addition, the solid organizational base opens many doors and possibilities, ranging from government 
support to possible contractual arrangements. In the Congo-Agriculture case, production is growing 
significantly (reaching 2,500 ha after the first year), creating jobs for about 45 permanent and 200 
temporary staff. 
 
Due to the bilateral agreements, performance thresholds and certain conditionalities are agreed 
upon. As such, again for Congo-Agriculture, the entire production (maize) was, according to the 
bilateral agreements, oriented to the domestic market. As imports are often the main chunk of local 
consumption, leading to high consumption prices, investors get good prices for their produce, while 
alleviating the dependency rate of the countries and lowering  local consumption prices (sometimes 
by 50%, as in the case of Congo).  
 
* Inclusiveness and local/national development 
 
On paper, mainly related to the bilateral agreements, the projects should include a significant range 
of benefits for local development and populations.5 In addition, on the ground several more indirect 
benefits occurred. In the Congo-Agriculture project (Favrot 2012): 
 
Investors revitalized boreholes and facilitated access to the latter for local communities; 
In the framework of the bilateral agreements, public infrastructure – such as roads and bridges – is 
enhanced by the government, facilitating the investors but also the local population access to the 
nearest towns, etc. 
And, through employment creation and enhanced infrastructure, an effective development, based 
on local dynamics, was instigated and would deserve a more in depth economic analysis. 
 
5  For Congo-Agriculture. these benefits range from production criteria, marketing and production use 
prerogatives, to the establishment of social infrastructure (schools, clinics), the development of productive 
assets and infrastructure (preparing fields, delivering water) and to employment creation. In addition, the 
transfer of technologies, and making available techniques and instruments are also often promoted on paper. 
In the case of Congo Agriculture for example, the creation of an “Agricultural College” is supposed to be the 
channel for the transfer of technologies. This includes training of farm workers, leadership training for farm 
managers, artisans training (plumber, woodwork, electrical), driver training and schooling education for adults 
(Favrot 2012). 
Box 1: Congo-Agriculture – the example of a cooperative production model 
 
Farmers are members of the mother union and cooperative structure and are farming collectively 
with a cooperative type of management. In a second phase, land can be subdivided and/or 
transferred to the partaking farmers. As is planned in Congo Agriculture, once the overall project 
is established, independent farming activities will be developed on individual plots. The latter will 
be developed autonomously, based on own inputs and contributions (for example, farmers will 
have to seek their own funding and lending opportunities). Three sub-models might exist in 
parallel: the first one will remain the cooperative activities (the farmers engaging in the latter will 
perceive a salary from the cooperative structure); a second sub-model will be based on individual 
farming activities (based on the independent farmer model); a third will take on the form of 
smaller syndicates that will gather a small number of independent farmers (based on the 
associative model). 
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This being said, this model is not an inclusive business model in the sense that local communities are 
not engaged and are not benefitting directly from the project. In addition, farming systems are highly 
mechanized (with relatively little job creation, considering the size of the project) and inspired by 
commercial farming operations with large-scale plantations and no out-grower schemes. Also, even if 
budgets for these activities and benefits are included in the business plans and agreements, the 
different contracts stay vague regarding the enforceability of these commitments. Here again, during 
the initial phases, the investors focus on their core business, leading the social aspects to fade away 
(at least temporarily). 
 
3.3 The 1,000-day model 
This model has the objective to make available a ready-to-start large farm operating in food or 
biofuel production on the international market in approximately three years (hence the 1,000 day 
model). The rationale of this hybrid model is based on two assumptions: 
 
an anticipation of a future demand for land for food and biofuel production; 
the significant increase of land value at the time the farm is ready to produce (and can be 
sold to an agribusiness company or an investment fund). 
 
The 1,000-day model can be defined as “land speculation”.6 
 
* Set-up and organizational characteristics of the model 
 
On one hand, a developer, i.e. a consultant/entrepreneur often locally integrated but with strong 
foreign business linkages, secures large-scale land rights. On the other hand, a “financer”, generally 
foreign agribusinesses (generally listed on a stock exchange market), investment funds or private 
equity investors, provides the financial resource (without directly engaging in the operations). The 
developer is either in charge of all the activities (in order to reduce risk) or, as is often the case, sub-
contracts parts of the activities to service providers. Because of the short timeframe of the project 
and the high level of risks and uncertainties, contracts are characterized by high level coordination 
established by the entrepreneur. The Inhassune plantation and project C3, both in the Inhambane 
province in Mozambique, are examples of this model.  
 
The expectation is to raise on average a 30% return on investment after 3 years, equivalent to a 
1,000 day establishment plan on farms of, on average, between 5,000 and 10,000 ha. The process to 
acquire the land or the right to use it is centralized. The developer uses political relations and 
networks, including within the relevant Ministries such as, for example, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
to facilitate the land acquisition process. Theoretically, after three years, once the farm is established 
and when the marginal profit starts decreasing, the farm is sold.7 
 
* Results, outcomes and sustainability 
 
6 This model is similar to the ones found in South America (mainly Argentina) (Rabobank 2011). Rabobank’s 
Industry Note describes this as a “land transformation model” and emphasizes that, “although they grow crops 
and own a feedlot and slaughterhouse, their main focus is on land transformation, developing farmland with 
productive potential and selectively selling those properties where values appreciation has been realized” 
(Rabobank 2011, p.3). This “1000 day model” is thus not new in the economic literature, though its 
implementation in Southern Africa is. 
7 The value of the farm continues to increase with the value of the production; however, one will never obtain 
again a sharp increase in the asset value. 
Land Deal Politics Initiative    
 
                                                            
Unraveling “land grabbing Page|11 
 
This model is one of the responses to the overall commercial pressure on land dynamics, in particular 
related to the jatropha promotion measures implemented in several African countries since 2004 
(Schut et al. 2010)  (Box2). Although many projects started, many of them are not taking-off 
effectively (but still allows the developer – or just the land-right holder in this case – to control the 
land rights), or collapsing before completion (before the 1000-days) and are never sold. For those 
finalized and sold, no or little effective production has come out of this model. The reason for the 
latter relies on the fact that the aim of these projects was never effective production, but rather land 
speculation by the developer. The Inhassune plantation, for example, developed by a well-integrated 
South-African developer, was sold according to this framework to Italian investors. During the time of 
the survey, a legal conflict mushroomed as the project was not suitable for effective production.8 
 
 
 
* Inclusiveness and local/national development 
 
This is probably the worst model in terms of inclusiveness and benefits because it is based solely on 
the capture of a rent from land transformation. Due to the centralized process and the time-
constrained implementation, it results in a lack, even total absence, of consultations with the local 
communities, almost no employment creation and in many cases no effective production. The large 
amount of failures of these projects has left the local communities not only with unproductive 
projects, but without any of the compensations promised. 
 
3.4 The Asset Management Companies model 
This model is characterized by the use of an asset management company as link between financial 
and business corporates willing to invest in agriculture. In comparison to the 1,000-day model, the 
objective of the asset management company model is not speculative but productive. In 
Mozambique, projects established for rice production in Chokwé, jatropha in Buzí and Gondola, 
sugarcane in Chemba and soya in Gurué have used this approach. Many of the South African based 
8 Interview with the CEO of ESV Bio Africa, 10/05/2012 
Box 2: Jatropha Speculation in Mozambique 
 
The Jatropha discussion started in 2004 in Mozambique when the President Armando Guebuza 
announced “Mozambique should be an oil-exporting country, […] and jatropha should be planted 
on all unused soils” (Schut et al. 2010). Since then, active promotion of jatropha production started 
in Mozambique. This promotion, as well as the European Policies on renewable energies and 
biofuels (20% renewables, 10% blending of biofuels for the transport sector) and considerations 
regarding jatropha’s drought resistance, creating the perception of Mozambique as a place with 
great opportunities for the development of jatropha, attracted numerous private investors, 
especially Europea,. In the meantime, project developers and asset management companies 
secured land rights over large tracks and proposed their skills to foreign investors. In 2007, the 
Government of Mozambique and the High Commissions of different countries (Italy, Netherlands) 
organized conferences on investment in biofuel production to facilitate its development and 
attract foreign direct investment. These were opportunities for project developers and asset 
management companies to present their projects to foreign investors and secure partnerships and 
financial resources. These promotional initiatives as well as of the lack of knowledge of investors 
led to the establishment of speculative models that never turned into productive ones. At present, 
the jatropha boom in Mozambique is over and the crop is not presented anymore as a strategic 
commodity for the country’s agricultural development. 
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asset management companies investing elsewhere in Africa, such as the Zeder-Chayton operations in 
the Mkushi farm block in the Zambia’s Central province, are similar. 
 
* Set-up and organizational characteristics of the model 
 
The financers are investment funds, willing to invest in agriculture. Several types of investors, 
presently negotiating their engagement or already actively involved, were identified, including: 
endowment funds (Emvest); corporates (Tata investment corporation), listed funds (Trading Emission 
PLC), private equity funds (BSX) and development finance institutions (FMO with the Dutch 
development bank and Phatisa with the French Cooperation) (Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2013). As 
financial institutions, they do not directly engage in the agricultural activities. The latter is engaged, 
as presented in Figure 2 (Buxton et al. 2012), by the fund managers and the asset management 
companies who play a central role in the fund-models set-up. In addition, in a large number of cases, 
side-sell analyst and auditing companies (Price Water House Cooper, KPMG, Ernst & Young, etc.) are 
contracted to monitor the activities implemented by the asset management company (Figure 2).  
 
Two established process are found on the ground. Firstly, investors launch a tender for a manager 
with a specific mandate; or secondly, which was more often found on the ground in the developing 
countries, the asset management company takes the lead in defining and establishing the project, 
while trying to get financers on board. In any case, asset management companies are responsible for 
the effective work on the ground, including fund management, project set-up and management 
(from land access and production to the organization of output markets), etc. The asset management 
company can either develop the land itself or contract specialized service providers. For example, 
The Niqel jatropha project in Buzi (Mozambique) invested in all the heavy machinery (bulldozer and 
excavators) needed to realize the land preparation (an initial investment of over US$4,000,000 
financed by the Dutch Jatropha Consortium), whereas the SunBioFuel project in Manica 
(Mozambique) subcontracted specialized service providers, Unitrans and Pressa, which were already 
well established in the road construction and forestry sectors. 
 
 
Figure 2: Investment actors and processes 
Source: Buxton et al. 2012 
 
Focusing on financial indicators (mainly high and short-term returns on investment), these financial 
corporates prefer large-scale commercial and mechanized agricultural projects, covering between 
5,000 and 10,000 ha without outgrower schemes. In addition, they generally use advanced risk 
management strategies.  
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While the production is delocalized (Mozambique, Zambia), investment funds, and more particularly 
the asset management companies, tend to reduce investment risk, by being based in more stable 
and well-established countries, such as South Africa. This strategy enables them to benefit from 
advanced financial tools (multi-peril insurances, futures and hedge markets); 
Geographical and commodity diversification through investment in several projects and countries 
also allows them to manage production risk, while benefiting from economies of scale (related to 
input purchases, reaching volume thresholds for market access, etc.); 
Focus purely on more lucrative markets (often host country or export), although – due to often 
higher output prices in the host country – many asset management companies are increasingly 
focusing on local markets. As such, while Emvest initially produced primarily for its home base and 
retail hub in Midrand (South Africa), it is now developing its activities around retail opportunities 
with locally based supermarkets. 
 
* Results, outcomes and sustainability 
 
The results of this model are nuanced. The technological and financial instruments have little (or 
certainly less) impact in unstable and not well-established environments. Much lower than expected 
returns often lead to a loss of confidence in many asset management companies and the withdrawal 
of funds. In many cases it resulted in a “cash-trap” and in the project being put on “stand-by” for a 
couple of years (Box 3). This is particularly true in the case of the asset management company taking 
the lead in project development before having secured finances.  
 
Box 3: The “cash-trap” situation in Mozambique 
 
One of the main results of the analyses conducted in Mozambique is the evolution of the 
organization of this model. Until 2010, financers were mainly financial corporate focusing on high 
and short-term returns on investment (15% on 5 years). However, suffering from the financial crisis 
and facing difficulties to obtain the high short-term returns expected, most of the corporate 
financers stopped investing. This situation resulted in a risky and chaotic development of the project 
with often one or two years of “stand-by”. The situation is then characterized by the ownership of a 
project with several hundreds of hectares already planted and several thousands of hectares for 
potential development but without funds to continue the activities. During this period of “cash trap”, 
the activity and number of people employed sharply decrease and are reduced to the minimum level 
for the maintenance of the area already planted. In the case of the large-scale SunBioFuel jatropha 
project in Manica, the corporate financer retracted its partnership after 3 years (in 2011) of the 
established 2,300 ha of jatropha plantation. From that time, the asset management company 
stopped employing most of the 200 workers and only maintained the management team and 5 
workers to realize the maintenance of the plantation. The asset management company only found 
new investors in early 2013 and activities should start again in 20149. A similar situation is happening 
to the Grown Energy Zambeze sugarcane project in Chemba. 
 
 
Consequently, the financial uncertainty results in two evolutions regarding this model. Firstly, it 
results in tighter control mechanisms, mainly through a higher degree of coordination and vertical 
integration by the asset management company. The Emvest example is again illustrative: EMVEST – 
initially only engaged in primary production but endeavoring to secure its own market linkages – is 
taking charge of the fresh produce sections of the newly planned SPAR supermarket in Beira 
(Mozambique). Secondly, asset management companies (particularly those who are not able to 
vertically integrate on their own) are now looking for business corporates with experience in 
9 Interview with the Manager of Sunbiofuel, 24/05/2013. 
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agribusiness value chains (sugarcane multinational companies, fertilizer producers or food and oil 
processors) to finance their projects as well as to overcome certain of their obstacles (market 
access). This change in partner implies a modification of the financial objectives and, consequently, 
of strategies. As such, a shift appears from short term to medium term returns (after 15 years) and, 
most importantly, a more significant focus on the acquisition of “raw material” coming from these 
projects for their other processing activities. 
 
* Inclusiveness and local/national development 
 
Although the production can benefit domestic economies, the potential benefits for local 
communities are often limited and mainly delayed because of the financial uncertainties faced by the 
asset management companies. Again, for most cases interviewed in less developed agrarian 
economies (i.e. other than South Africa) and where asset managers take the lead, the initial risky 
establishment of activities is a compulsory pre-requisite to find investors interested in financing the 
project. However, this period of “cash trap” is often perceived by local community members, local 
government official and NGOs as the failure of the project and leads to latent conflicts. 
 
3.5 Contracting model 
The main characteristic of this model is its structuration around contractual arrangements for 
production. This model can exist in its most simplified format, such as contract farming, or as more 
complex institutional arrangements, as described by (Cotula et al. 2010). As such, beyond contract 
farming, three other variants or sub-models are identified. 
 
The first sub-model is a nucleus-estate one, centered around agribusinesses, which are partly 
integrating primary production activities and partly procuring through contractual arrangements with 
local (or foreign) farmers. An agribusiness integrates directly through primary production (the 
nucleus) on a large scale (several hundred to several thousand hectares) and indirectly through the 
development of outgrower schemes (the estate). Although previously mainly embedded within high 
value crop export value-chains (high quality vegetables or organic sugarcane for example) (Burnod et 
al. 2012), it is presently developed for a diversity of production models, for example by SAB-Miller in 
Tanzania or by Companhia de Vanduzi in Mozambique.  
 
The second sub-model is a management contract under which the agribusiness develops all the 
activities in exchange for access to land. This kind of contractual agreement can be referred to as a 
“reverse tenancy” sub-model (Colin 2013), where individuals, farmers’ associations or communities 
make available land to an agribusiness which exploits it for their own account. Examples of this sub-
model are often found in the plantations sector, such as for eucalyptus plantations in the north of 
Mozambique, or in South Africa where agribusinesses manage the land on behalf of land reform 
beneficiaries (Lahiff et al. 2012). 
 
These models go beyond contract farming, which has been developed extensively in the region 
(Pitcher 1998, Vermeulen et al. 2010, Freguin-Gresh et al. 2012) but which does not entail the 
acquisition of land for primary production by the agribusiness. 
 
The third one, the ingrower sub-model, consists of independent farmers or agribusinesses that 
acquire land for his/its own production and provides (un-used) portions of land to selected local 
farmers or employees to cultivate. All farmers, i.e. agribusinesses/main commercial producers and 
ingrowers produce according to a common technical itinerary, including input and output channels.  
 
* Set-up and organizational characteristics of the model 
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Every sub-model has its own organizational characteristics, depending on the terms of the contract. 
However, they all imply some common aspects.  
 
First of all, the main aim of these agribusinesses entering primary production is to secure supply of 
production at a lower and more stable price (compared to the prices on the present global markets), 
often in order to sustain the significant investments in (processing) facilities in which they are 
engaged.10 Their strategy is then based on a trade-off between their own production (but which 
implies production risks), contractual arrangements with local farmers (with a certain level of 
transaction costs), and procurement on the spot market (characterized by quantity and price 
fluctuation).  
 
Secondly, these contract models present a high degree of coordination, managed by the agribusiness 
or main commercial entity/farmer. As such, the latter imposes all production specifications and 
controls input and output markets. In many cases, the agribusiness also controls the entire technical 
itinerary of production, such as planting patterns, seed varieties, fertilizers, chemicals as well as 
technical support – which are provided by the agribusiness, while payed by the out- or ingrower. By 
doing so, they secure continuous supply and reduce (contracting) transactions costs. To facilitate this 
coordination, agribusinesses work with farmers’ associations or groups (from 5 to 50 farmers).  
 
* Results, outcomes and sustainability 
 
Established by well-structured and developed agribusinesses (often multinationals) or commercial 
entities/farmers, the model is relatively stable. In addition, the association between agribusinesses 
and farmers allows overcoming the many obstacles encountered by local or independent commercial 
farmers (finance, input and output markets, etc.). As such, many local and independent farmers 
(including those described in the first model) seek to enter in such contractual arrangements with 
agribusinesses.  
 
Important to note is the engagement, directly or indirectly (i.e. financing of such models) of non-
agricultural businesses on the basis of similar models in agriculture (for example, besides 
supermarkets, breweries such as SAB-Miller in Tanzania, also mining, marketing and transport 
companies have been engaging in primary agricultural production). 
 
Promoted as public-private partnership by national governments and international institutions, this 
strategy is often seen as a “win-win-win” situation for the agribusiness, local/independent farmers 
and the national governments/international donors. The establishment of such models is thus often 
supported and relies on the financial and technical participation of international donors and NGOs 
(Box 4). For example, the former benefit from financial resources or concessionary loans. NGOs and 
development projects are also involved to secure land rights for the farmer associations11 or 
providing them with inputs.  
 
Box 4: Numerous examples of State and donor support for diverse contracting models linking 
agribusinesses with local/independent farmers 
 
* The corridor or cluster approaches – The Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor (BAGC) 
The BAGC initiative is a partnership between the Government of Mozambique, private investors, 
farmer organizations and international agencies. It was launched in 2010 and aims at promoting 
10 This is the case for the sugar industry for example, where the mils have to turn a certain number of hours a day 
in order to be economically viable.  
11 The process of land right formalization have been realized through the Iniciativa Terras Comunitarias program 
(ITC) and the soya producers are benefiting from seeds and technical support from Technoserve.  
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increased investments in commercial agriculture and agribusiness within the Beira Corridor (Tete, 
Sofala and Manica Provinces). One of their facilities, the Smallholder Support Facility, supports the 
implementation of initiatives leading to the development of sustainable and replicable models of 
integrating smallholder farmers into markets. The facility will focus on those initiatives that seek to 
address agricultural support service constraints faced by market-focused smallholder farmers. The 
range of initiatives to be financed includes: i) Innovative models for supply of relevant agricultural 
support services (technology development and transfer initiatives, training, credit etc.) benefiting 
smallholder farmers; ii) private sector-driven outgrower schemes in priority value chains for the 
corridor. 
 
* Strategic partnerships for South Africa’s land reform beneficiaries  
 
In the framework of South Africa’s land reform programmes, large areas of high-value irrigated land 
have been restored to relatively poor communities.  In order to maintain the productivity of 
commercial farming enterprises, and to maximise long-term benefits for their members, these 
communities have entered into contractual arrangements with so-called ‘strategic partners’, most of 
which take the form of joint ventures. While the state funds the land transfer and provides certain 
start-up grants, the strategic partner is expected to provide technical and managerial expertise and 
arrange access to commercial sources of credit. In return, the strategic partners expect to benefit 
from a share of profits, a management fee and opportunities for additional upstream and 
downstream activities. Communities stand to benefit from land rentals and a share of operating 
profits, as well as jobs and training opportunities for their members (Lahiff et al. 2011). 
 
* Inclusiveness and local/national development 
 
This model can be beneficial in terms of local development. Not only does it contribute to job 
creation in the processing segments, it also facilitates the inclusion of independent farmers based on 
different schemes. The reduction or removal of entry barriers can allow “accumulation from below” 
(Cousins 2013). In addition, this model, related to its often centrally negotiated set-up and support 
by government or international donors, is benefiting from publicly supported infrastructural 
development (i.e. road infrastructure, electricity, water), which is also furthering local development. 
Some of the agribusinesses engaged in this model, through their corporate social responsibilities 
programs, also engage in social infrastructure development through the development of schools, 
clinics, etc.  
 
However, due to a problem of inconsistency, high quality standards of increasingly restructured 
markets (Louw et al. 2007), and biased power relations (Lahiff et al. 2012), this model might show 
unequal benefit repartition as well as an exclusionary pattern of local/community farmers (Freguin-
Gresh et al. 2012). Also, emerging (often urban) elites, as well as foreign commercial producers, tend 
to be integrated more easily into these models. This is particularly the case of several independent 
South African farmers, who are invited by agribusinesses to get involved in contract models in third 
countries. Lastly, the social implications of some of these should also be highlighted as farmers find 
themselves incorporated into production chains in which they are isolated actors with no decision-
making or orientation power. With technical capital used not belonging to them but is made 
available, owned and managed by the management company, these farmers’ situations are 
increasingly similar to those of proletarian agricultural employees, service providers or even just 
rent-seekers (Anseeuw et al. 2011). 
 
3.6 Agribusiness Estate 
This model is characterized by the full vertical integration of the different segments of an agricultural 
value-chain, mainly through foreign multinationals or listed enterprises on foreign stock markets. 
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* Set-up and organizational characteristics of the model 
 
Several forms of such enterprises are identified: 
 
o Large private agribusinesses, expanding their markets and portfolios (eucalyptus plantations in 
Mozambique by Portucel; cattle breeding with control of feed production, feedlots, abattoir and 
even retail networks by Zambeef in Zambia); 
o Colonial structures that are being revitalized by the host government, by recalling and 
redeveloping old and faded ties (mostly for the sugarcane plantations and mills in Mozambique); 
o Foreign parastatals aimed at securing access to agricultural commodities (for example, for food 
security in the country of origin, etc.). This is the case of a Malaysian investor in Congo Republic 
(Favrot 2012). 
 
These very large projects (often more than 10,000 ha) often rely on irrigated crops, are highly 
mechanized and involve capital-intensive business models.  
 
Total integration relates to diverse elements. A first element is related to the crop characteristics. 
This is particularly the case for sugarcane production, for example, which necessitates direct 
transformation. Companies such as Illovo, Tongaat-Hulett and TSB are very well established in the 
region and are presently investing in Southern African countries based on this model. As well as 
these South African companies, some European companies (Tereos in Mozambique for example) are 
also present. It is also the case for eucalyptus as a large part of its value comes from the 
transformation process. A second and more recent tendency is the decision of certain transformation 
industries to integrate primary production. Such processes have been accelerating since the food 
price crisis, the reduction of world food stocks and the increase of basic food commodity prices in 
2008-2009 (mainly with the aim to reduce costs and secure procurement). This is the strategy for 
certain fruit and vegetable transforming enterprises, integrated beef and other meat productions. 
 
* Results, outcomes and sustainability 
 
On one hand, these large operations may have important implications for national agricultural sector 
growth as well as energy autonomy but, on the other hand, imply important risks. These large 
projects are often considered to be strategic by national authorities. This political support generally 
implies a centralized decision regarding the approval of the project and access to land. In the case of 
the eucalyptus value chain and also in the sugar value chain, the large financial resources invested in 
these projects, the industrial management of the processing factory and the risks involved in 
contracting with other farmers, push for greater control of the value chain by agribusinesses. As 
such, this agricultural investment model presents a high level of coordination or even a total 
integration of all the activities. Although some agribusinesses contract with service providers able to 
furnish solutions for very specific activities, such as loading and transport logistics and for a broader 
range of mechanized services, in the majority of the cases, the agribusinesses vertically integrate all 
the activities. Finally, this mode of production is based on large-scale, intensive mono-cropping, 
which is not without environmental concerns. 
 
* Inclusiveness and local/national development 
 
Beneficial at a national level (alleviating food security, increasing food production and job creation), 
benefits for local populations often remain limited. The latter could be potentially higher, particularly 
in the framework of the company’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies. Also, as a result of 
the strategic character of these investments for host governments and the political support deployed 
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for such projects, this model implies a centralized decision process, often leading to a lack of 
consultations with the local population (Box 5).  
 
Box 5: Centralized establishment of agribusiness activities, leaving out local communities 
 
This is the case for the eucalyptus value chain for paper production in Mozambique. The Portucel 
company will establish (in 2015) two factories in Manica and Zambezia provinces with planned 
employment for more than a thousand people each. In order to secure enough raw materials, the 
Government of Mozambique allocated land rights on more than 200,000 ha to Portucel.12 Not 
consulted and thus leaving local communities with few refusal opportunities, the provincial 
Geography and Cadastral services even received letters from the central Ministry of Agriculture 
indicating that they had to approve the land right allocation for a specific investor.13 
 
In addition, this model is an example of what Ferguson (2005) calls “enclave economies”. Hall (2011) 
described these models as “involving outright takeover of land and related resources and the 
construction of related infrastructure, partly to provide inputs and process output of a commercial 
enterprise.” This is certainly the case of the Mkushi farm block in the Zambia’s Central province, 
which – although still dormant for the most part – is an enclave identified for the promotion of large-
scale commercial entities. Lastly, and particularly in the case of foreign parastatals aiming at securing 
access to agricultural commodities, the full production might be exported to the investing country, 
leaving out local markets and economies. 
 
4 The difficult trajectory of foreign agricultural investments in Southern Africa 
Certain models seem to be developing more in specific countries. All models tend to develop in 
relatively liberal Zambia. Congo tends to rely on a centralized administration, leading to models 
based on bilateral negotiations such the cooperative model, the nucleus-estate and the agribusiness 
one. An intermediary dynamic can be identified in Mozambique, where at the national level a more 
centralized system leads to the larger cooperative/nucleus-estate/asset management ones; however, 
through its provincial administration, independent, associative and asset management models are 
established at provincial level. 
 
Despite these divergences, all the models reflect three common tendencies: a high investment 
failure rate, a tendency to increased value-chain integration and little inclusiveness of local 
populations. 
 
4.1 The rush back home? A large majority of investments are failing 
A consensus exists in the research community on the fact that a high proportion of deals that are 
reported by the press are never implemented (Anseeuw et al. 2012). Indeed, the failure of a project 
can happened at different stages of negotiation or implementation. A lot of investors expressed 
interest or even started the process to get access to land but abandoned the project before getting 
the official recognition of their land rights. Nevertheless, even among the project that managed to 
obtain their formal land rights and started establishing their project, a high level of failure had been 
identified. In this case, we consider a failure of the project when the management team of the 
project left the area for more than a year. A detailed analysis of the agricultural projects approved 
between 2007 and 2012 in four Mozambican provinces (Sofala, Manica, Zambezia and Nampula) 
12 Interview with the general manager of the eucalyptus plantation, May 2013. 
13 Interview with staff of Geography and Cadastral Provincial Services in a central province of Mozambique, 
March 2013. 
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show the failure of 63% of the projects. This level of failure is even higher for the projects dedicated 
to biofuel production (77%).14 
 
According to the interviews conducted with farm managers, four main reasons explaining this high 
level of failure can be identified. First, the high settling and transaction costs to establish a business 
in Africa. All the project managers interviewed emphasized the necessity of collecting soil, climate 
and land use data in details in order to identify the specific location area of the project. On top of 
these costs, one has to add all the travel expenses, the consultancies, the transaction costs related to 
the understanding of the business environment, the cost of land access and the bribes. For a project 
implying a land access of 5,000 ha, this cost is estimated to be between US$500,000 and $750,000. 
This means, that before acquiring the equipment, preparing the land and planting, the investors must 
be sure to have these funds available15 Most of the investors, especially the non-African ones 
underestimated this difficulty. As a result, South African and Zimbabwean consultants and fund 
managers are now particularly targeted by investors to reduce these implementation costs. The 
second reason is the technicality of the projects. Most of the investors underestimate the technical 
and managerial difficulties related to the implementation of large-scale agriculture in often difficult 
ecological, political, bureaucratic and socio-economic environments. The case of the South African 
farmers in Congo illustrates the latter. Being affected by several unconsidered technical issues, such 
as tropical maize pests, etc., their productivity remains far below expectations leading to difficulties 
to honor loans and contractual arrangements. Third, the lack of financial resources and services leads 
the projects into a “cash trap”. Financial services used by these projects come from more established 
economies, such as South Africa or other developed countries. Local financial services are very 
expansive and often not adapted to settling investors, especially in agriculture. For example, 
commercial bank’s interest rates are 23% in Mozambique for an agricultural company that wants to 
produce for the domestic market. Fourth, the lack of local markets well developed to buy inputs and 
commercialize the production. Exports markets are often difficult to reach, transport costs are high 
and norms and non-tariff barriers frequently impact the individual farmers that can deliver relatively 
low volume and irregular production (particularly in the early phase). 
 
The high failure rate depicts a “not-so–rosy” story concerning the land deals that have been 
implemented. A large number of projects have failed even before effectively starting to produce. It 
pushes many to return to their country of origin, representing a rush back home. Others tried to 
change their investment model (forming associations or implementing activities through the 
cooperative model) or work for other investors (as subcontracting farmers for asset management 
companies or nucleus estate models). This pattern of failure leads to rapidly changing strategies of 
the investors, leading to the typology of models presented being dynamic. Failing investors re-
strategize and engage in different models as they seek new financial resources (including from 
international cooperation agencies). Another implication of this high level of failure is that better-off 
investors take over the land of failed projects leading to more concentrated agrarian structures but 
also to first hand negotiations and local population’s inclusiveness often to be neglected. Moreover, 
after the failure of the project the population can stay or come back on the land but with insecure 
land rights because the land is already identified as a potential area for investors. As generally 
considered in economic development literature, this pattern of even more insecure land rights will 
have consequences on agricultural development of local farmers who already complain about the 
limited access to land to maintain their itinerant farming systems and about the lack of possibilities 
to buy fertilizer to change this farming system.   
 
14 Author’s calculations based on CPI and CEPAGRI data (2007-2012) and fieldwork monitoring. 
15 Interviews with farm manager of jatropha projects and business consultants, May 2012. 
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4.2 Vertical coordination - A necessity for success? 
An increased tendency towards vertical integration is indeed a common trend observable in all the 
models identified. Not only is there an increasing degree of integration from the first independent 
farmer model towards the last agribusiness estate model; the tendency is also observable within 
each model. Indeed, all of them tend to integrate their activities in an overall vertically integrated 
entity. Moreover the many difficulties encountered by a large majority of investors reinforce the 
conviction among investors that vertical integration is the way forward. 
 
This integration process encompasses not only the farm itself, but often integrates the entire chain of 
agriculture-related activities, including seed supply, processing, machinery, storage, transport, 
marketing, and in some cases outlets, shops and restaurants. The approach is not new, and several 
agricultural export sub-sectors (such as coffee, cotton, etc.) are already structured according to this 
model, particularly in Latin America (Rabobank 2011). However, over the past few years, this strategy 
has been applied more widely, both geographically (Southern Africa) and across agricultural sub-
sectors (meat, cereal, etc.).  
 
This process of vertical integration or coordination is driven by local and international factors. Firstly, 
according to Vermeulen et al. (2010) investors expect a reversal of the risk/profit relationship within 
the production value chains because of the increased interest and increased commodity prices. 
Whereas primary production constituted until now the main risk factor, with profits returning to 
downstream and upstream actors, the increase in agricultural prices now tends, at least according to 
investors’ strategies, to invert this relationship benefiting as such the primary production activities. 
This leads to agribusinesses or other corporates to integrate primary agricultural production in their 
portfolios, developing strategies to secure fixed supply and reduce the risk of commodity price 
volatility. Secondly, avoiding the above-mentioned obstacles is another main reason for investors to 
vertically integrate. Vertical integration is a frequently applied strategy in order to overcome market 
imperfections. The more the coordination goes toward integrated forms, the more the risk 
decreases, resource access is secured and bargaining power is strengthened (Reardon et al. 2009).  
 
4.3 Few inclusive agricultural development models 
These failures and the necessary vertical integration lead to few inclusive agricultural development 
models. This leads to three direct consequences. The first one is related to the challenges for local 
farmers to participate and benefit from the present land and agricultural investments as the latter 
tend to be more and more integrated. This integration, and by consequence the increasingly closed 
nature of the developing value-chains, implies large-scale land acquisitions to represent exclusive 
rather than inclusive development models. Related to this, the second one concerns the ‘isolation’ of 
many of the foreign investments. Indeed, as very few inclusive models are being developed, and a 
lack of relationships being created with local farmers and stakeholders, many of the foreign 
investments remain isolated and are developed as “enclave economies” poorly integrated to their 
surrounding society and economies (Ferguson 2005). The third one concerns overall agricultural 
development, in particular for local economies and populations. Based on the present observations, 
success of these investments does not necessarily mean the development of local agricultural 
economies. Although some models and specific projects do endeavor to integrate local development 
objectives in their model, several avoid it, particularly since the core establishment of the projects 
tends to be difficult. When some projects include certain social aspects, the capacity of such 
measures to structurally change local economies remains limited. 
 
Where local populations are excluded from development initiatives, an escalation of competition 
into conflict is a significant risk. In many cases, popular discontent has so far taken the form of 
peaceful advocacy and protest movements (Matavel et al. 2012). Where injustice is seen as 
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unresolved, the risk that such disputes and movements lead to direct and violent confrontations is 
real (Madagascar being the major example in Southern Africa) (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 
2011). 
 
5 Conclusion: Towards  major agrarian transformation in Southern Africa? 
The global land rush has profound economic and social implications for agrarian societies. Some are 
direct, such as the loss of land as well as the loss of livelihood; other are indirect and concern, among 
others, women’s land rights (Daley 2011, HLPE 2011), water access (Woodhouse 2012, Adamczewski 
et al. 2013), environmental degradation through intensification (Horne 2011), and loss of biodiversity 
(Deininger et al. 2011). In addition to these already well-described, case-study illustrated 
consequences, the analysis detailed in this paper reflects profound economic and social 
transformations in agricultural structures and contextualizes the large-scale land phenomenon 
according to broader agrarian dynamics. Besides Borras et al. (2012), detailing emerging dynamics of 
changes in land use and property relations, the above presented typology of large-scale land 
acquisition models and their dynamics provide a strong basis to illustrate the dynamics that can 
trigger agrarian transformations in Southern Africa. 
 
A first significant element of Southern Africa’s agricultural structural transformation is the far-
reaching vertical integration process, related to integration of the different value-chain segments. As 
illustrated through the different models presented in this paper, large-scale land acquisitions go 
along with the increasing control over the various segments of a value-chain. Either implemented 
voluntarily or as a necessitating strategy used by investors, it results in the establishment and 
development of structures and enterprises that are significant in size. On one hand, it leads to the 
“corporatization” of agriculture. This dynamic is not related to mechanization per se but rather to a 
transformation of the production structures (Anseeuw et al. 2011). As such, the agricultural value-
chains are increasingly controlled by a few dominant actors, mainly corporates. On the other hand, in 
the presence of advanced vertical integration through which companies not only control the primary 
production but also the upstream and downstream activities, closed value-chains tend to be 
developed. Not only does it result in companies controlling the productive cycle and its markets (for 
example, export of total production (McMichael 2012)), it also results in these companies intervening 
as a regulator within these value-chains, directly controlling supply quotas, price setting, production 
norms, etc. (Bernstein 1996). 
 
A second element is related to the “financialization” of the agricultural sector. As emphasized by the 
different models presented in this paper, investment in land and in agricultural production is not just 
engaging agribusinesses and farmers solely; financial investors, asset management funds and 
companies are now important stakeholders in the agricultural sector. As such, originating from 
industrial or financial sectors, engaging as entrepreneurs, investors or even as pure speculators, the 
suppliers of capital seem more and more exogenous to the agricultural sector. These new actors 
import into the agricultural sector new practices, business logics, modes of actions and outside 
experiences. Their interactions and inputs alter the sector’s "traditional" modes of action, investment 
and production. Through the increasing role and direct engagement into the sector of investors and 
financial actors, and their use of advanced financial instruments (such as future markets), 
“financialization” of the agricultural sector is taking place, which is redefining the traditional borders 
of the agricultural sector (Anseeuw et al. 2011). 
 
A third point deals with foreignization of space (Zoomers 2010). In South Africa the dominant 
investors, which include commercial banks, investment funds and certain former cooperatives, are 
domestically based. However, the different entities (agribusinesses, investment funds, etc.) investing 
in other Southern African countries are often foreign based, even if domestic elites are involved as 
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partners in the projects (Fairbairn 2013). But in both cases, the financial structures of these bodies 
are increasingly globalised (McMichael 2012). The fact that investors are foreign is not a problem in 
itself. It can however become an issue as these actors are acting within closed value-chains, 
according to principles (such as the financial ones) borrowed from other sectors. As foreign economic 
powers control more and more land and segments of value-chains, they transfer regulatory powers 
on domestic issues such as local rural development and agricultural development abroad, raising 
questions as to the decisions over standards, norms and regulation mechanisms applied within these 
value chains and countries. It leads to a foreignization not only of the sector, but also of its regulatory 
mechanisms (Bülher et al. 2012). 
 
The fourth element of agrarian transformation is linked to a concentration and dualization process 
of the agricultural sector. On one hand, the establishment of large-scale projects inevitably leads to 
concentration in the Southern African agricultural sector. Indeed, the dual processes of vertical 
integration and financialization/corporatization leads to an agricultural sector characterised by the 
dominion of a few large international food-business groups (Huggins 2011). This pattern of 
concentration is reinforced by the high level of failure of the projects because the better-off 
investors buy-out the projects that are failing. On the other hand, as shown through the non-
inclusiveness of the investment models, the large majority of the rural masses and smallholder 
farmers are excluded from the investment processes (intentionally in order to avoid risks and 
transaction costs or due to the negative results achieved and the refocus on core activities). Here 
too, marginalisation is intensified through often biased competition and unequal power relations. 
This results in agrarian economies that are developing at dual speeds and in different directions, with 
concentration, marginalization and dualization processes at stake. With mega-structures being 
established, that are swallowing medium-sized entities (mainly taking over the land from the many 
failures), and with smallholders being excluded, the present large-scale land acquisition process is 
leading to a sector characterised by extreme dualization. 
 
Finally, the fifth element is related to social transformations. While the emergence of these 
production models has the potential to generate numerous economic related transformations, social 
impacts should also be highlighted. Not only are many excluded from these processes, leading to the 
transformation of dispossessed peasants to “surplus people” (Li 2011). Those able to access these 
value chains find themselves incorporated into production chains in which they are isolated actors 
with no decision-making or orientation power. The incorporation process of family-based producers 
by macro-actors and corporates thus modifies their relationships with the sector. As such, this 
situation not only changes the social relations of property and land, as emphasized by Borras et al. 
(2012), but also changes the social status of the farmers. Although in some cases they remain the 
owners of the land, their situation is increasingly similar to that of proletarian agricultural employees 
or even just rent-seekers. Generally, the technical capital used, characterized by ever-increasing 
costs, does not belong to them but is made available, owned and managed by the management 
company (Anseeuw et al. 2012).  
 
Is Southern Africa effectively undergoing large-scale and profound agrarian transformations? The 
question is all the more relevant as, on one hand, large-scale land projects remain relatively small in 
number (all models included, Zambia counts 13 reported deals; Mozambique 124 and Republic of 
Congo 7 (Land Matrix 2011)) and, on the other hand, most of these deals, as detailed in this paper, 
are failing. This being said, several elements allow us to emphasize the significance of the trends 
detailed here above and the large-scale implications of the process on the sector. Firstly, since it 
concerns large-scale initiatives, it does concern a significant proportion of the arable land of these 
countries. As such, in Mozambique for example, large-scale land right attribution for agriculture to 
foreign investors between 2007 and 2011 accounted for at least 955 000 ha,16 representing 15% of 
16 This total number does not include the forestry concessions as well as the project for wildlife breeding. 
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the available land suitable for agriculture.17 Secondly, as described in the paper, the establishments 
finally developing are structures that are strongly integrated, controlling important parts of the 
agrarian economy or of specific commodities through closed value-chains. As is the case in Brazil and 
Argentina (Rabobank 2011), and to a lesser extent in South Africa (Anseeuw et al. 2013), the few 
corporate structures tend to concentrate power and develop an oligopolistic sector. Although small 
in number, the trend of land rights attributed to them and thus the implication for the sector are 
significant. Lastly, these restructurings could be long term and strongly embedded, as the large-scale 
farm development paradigm is presently openly promoted. Not only do smallholders benefit little 
from present agricultural investment dynamics, but also agricultural policies and support measures 
tend to shift away from the former towards the facilitation of large-scale investment. In most cases, 
smallholders tend to be more than ever excluded from present dynamics and policies. As such, a new 
agricultural development paradigm has been emerging (De Janvry 2010), or rather a new one has 
become dominant in official discourses, manifesting itself both at the national and international 
levels. Agricultural development centered on large-scale commercial and corporate farming has 
become the reigning paradigm. Conveyed by investors, it is presently being promoted by the 
different governments in the region, as well as being spread across the continent through public 
development agencies. 
 
So, although Southern Africa’s agrarian transformations are not broad-based, the control by a few 
has wide-ranging implications for the agricultural sector. These implications are directly related to 
the transformation of the countries’ agrarian societies through corporatization, financialization, 
concentration, dualization, and foreignization. They also cause a shift towards a dominant corporate-
based paradigm and lead to questions regarding the future of small-scale commercial farming within 
agricultural development. 
 
 
References 
1. Adamczewski, A., J.-Y. Jamin, P. Burnod and J.-P. Tonneau. 2013. Terre, eau et capitaux: 
investissements ou accaparements fonciers à l’Office du Niger? Cahiers Agricultures 22(1), 22-32. 
2. Andrianirina-Ratsialonana, R., L. Ramarojohn, P. Burnod and A. Teyssier. 2011. After Daewoo? 
Current status and perspectives of large scale land acquisitions in Madagascar. Commercial 
Pressures on Land. ILC. Rome, Observatoire du Foncier/CIRAD. 
3. Anseeuw, W., M. Boche, T. Breu, M. Giger, J. Lay, P. Messerli and K. Nolte. 2012. Transnational 
land deals for agriculture in the global south. Analytical report based on the Land Matrix 
Database. Bern/Montpellier/Hamburg: CDE/CIRAD/GIGA. 
4. Anseeuw, W., A. Ducastel and M. Boche. 2013. Nouveaux modèles de production et 
d'investissement en Afrique du Sud. Etudes rurales(2), 147-160. 
5. Anseeuw, W., A. Ducastel and J.-J. Gabas. 2011. The end of the African peasant? From 
investment funds and finance value chains to peasant related questions. International 
Conference on Global Land Grabbing. Brighton, UK. 
6. Bernstein, H. 1996. The political economy of the maize filière. The Journal of Peasant Studies 
23(2-3), 120-145. 
7. Borras, S. and J. Franco. 2010. From Threat to Opportunity-Problems with the Idea of a Code of 
Conduct for Land-Grabbing. Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. LJ 13, 507. 
8. Borras, S. J. M. and J. C. Franco. 2012. Global Land Grabbing and Trajectories of Agrarian Change: 
A Preliminary Analysis. Journal of Agrarian Change 12(1), 34-59. 
17 Author calculation from CPI and CEPAGRI data monitored on the ground and estimation of arable land 
available and suitable for agriculture realized during the Agroecological zoning. 
   Land Deal Politics Initiative 
 
                                                            
Page|24 Working Paper 46 
 
9. Bülher, E.-A., M. Guibert and D. Requier-Desjardins. 2012. Business Agriculture : Definition and 
questions from South American realities. 6eme journées de recherche en sciences sociales INRA-
SFER-CIRAD, Toulouse. 
10. Burnod, P., J.-P. Colin, F. Ruf, S. Freguin-Gresh, J. Clerc, G. Faure, I. Vagneron, W. Anseeuw, E. 
Cheyns and G. Vognan. 2012. Large-scale agricultural investments and inclusion of smallholder 
farmers: lessons of experiences in 7 southern countries. Land Tenure Working Paper. FAO. 
Rome/Montpellier, FAO/CIRAD. 23. 
11. Burnod, P., M. Gingembre and R. Andrianirina Ratsialonana. 2013. Competition over Authority 
and Access: International Land Deals in Madagascar. Development and change 44(2), 357-379. 
12. Buxton, A., M. Campanale and L. Cotula. 2012. Farms and funds: investment funds in the global 
land rush. IIED Briefing papers. IIED. London. 
13. Cochet, H. and M. Merlet. 2011. Land grabbing and share of the value added in agricultural 
processes. A new look at the distribution of land revenues. International Academic Conference 
"Global Land Grabbing" 6-8 April. 
14. Colin, J.-P. 2013. Marchés fonciers et concentration foncière : la configuration de "tenure 
inversée" (reverse tenancy). Les Cahiers du Pôle Foncier. Montpellier, Pôle Foncier. 3: 29. 
15. Cotula, L. 2012. The international political economy of the global land rush: A critical appraisal of 
trends, scale, geography and drivers. The Journal of Peasant Studies 39(3-4), 649-680. 
16. Cotula, L., S. Vermeulen, R. Leonard and J. Keeley. 2010. Land grab or development opportunity? 
agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa. London/Rome: IIED/FAO/IFAD. 
17. Cousins, B. 2013. Smallholder Irrigation Schemes, Agrarian Reform and ‘Accumulation from 
Above and from Below’ in South Africa. Journal of Agrarian Change 13(1), 116-139. 
18. Daley, E. 2011. Gendered impacts of commercial pressures on land. Commercial Pressures on 
Land. Rome, ILC: 67. 
19. De Janvry, A. 2010. Agriculture for development: new paradigm and options for success. 
Agricultural Economics 41, 17-36. 
20. Deininger, K. W. and D. Byerlee. 2011. Rising global interest in farmland: can it yield sustainable 
and equitable benefits?, World Bank Publications. 
21. Ducastel, A. and W. Anseeuw. 2013. Agriculture as an asset class: Financialisation of the South 
African farming sector. The Fourth Annual Conference in Political Economy, The Hague. 
22. Fairbairn, M. 2013. Indirect Dispossession: Domestic Power Imbalances and Foreign Access to 
Land in Mozambique. Development and change 44(2), 335-356. 
23. Favrot, M. 2012. L'investissement de fermiers sud-africains dans l'agriculture congolaise: 
accaparement foncier ou opportunité? Paris, AgroParistech. Master. 
24. Ferguson, J. 2005. Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal 
Africa. American Anthropologist 107(3), 377-382. 
25. Freguin-Gresh, S., M. d'Haese and W. Anseeuw. 2012. Demythifying contract farming: Evidence 
from rural South Africa. Agrekon 51(3), 24-51. 
26. Hall, R. 2011. Land grabbing in Southern Africa: the many faces of the investor rush. Review of 
African Political Economy 38(128), 193-214. 
27. Hall, R. 2012. The next Great Trek? South African commercial farmers move north. The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 39(3-4), 823-843. 
28. Hammar, A. 2010. Ambivalent Mobilities: Zimbabwean Commercial Farmers in Mozambique. 
Journal of Southern African Studies 36(2), 395-416. 
29. HLPE. 2011. Land tenure and international investment in agriculture. Rome, Committee on World 
Food Security. 
Land Deal Politics Initiative    
 
Unraveling “land grabbing Page|25 
 
30. Horne, F. 2011. Understanding land deals in Africa: Country report, Ethiopia. Understanding land 
deals. San Francisco, Oakland Institute. 
31. Huggins, C. 2011. Commercial pressure on land in its historical perspective. Commercial 
Pressures on land. Rome, ILC. 
32. Lahiff, E., N. Davis and T. Manenzhe. 2012. Joint ventures in agriculture: Lessons from land reform 
projects in South Africa: IIED. 
33. Land Matrix. 2011. CDE/CIRAD/ILC/GIGA/GIZ. 
34. Li, T. M. 2011. Centering labor in the land grab debate. The Journal of Peasant Studies 38(2), 281-
298. 
35. Louw, A., D. Chikazunga, D. Jordaan and E. Biénabe. 2007. Restructuring food markets in South 
Africa: Dynamics within the context of the tomato subsector. Regoverning Markets Agrifood 
Sector Studies. London, IIED. 
36. Matavel, N., S. Dolores and V. Cabanelas. 2012. Lords of the Land: preliminary analysis of the 
phenomenon of landgrabbing in Mozambique. Maputo, UNAC. 
37. McCarthy, J. F. 2010. Processes of inclusion and adverse incorporation: oil palm and agrarian 
change in Sumatra, Indonesia. The Journal of Peasant Studies 37(4), 821-850. 
38. McMichael, P. 2012. The land grab and corporate food regime restructuring. The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 39(3-4), 681-701. 
39. Ménard, C. 2004. The economics of hybrid organizations. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 160(3), 345-376. 
40. Nhantumbo, I. and A. Salomão. 2010. Biofuels, land access and rural livelihoods in Mozambique. 
London: IIED. 
41. O’Brien, E. 2011. Irregular and illegal land acquisition by Kenya’s elites: Trends, processes and 
impacts of the Kenya’s land grabbing phenomenon. Commercial Pressures on Land. Rome, 
International Land Coalition. 
42. Peluso, N. L. and C. Lund. 2011. New frontiers of land control: Introduction. The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 38(4), 667-681. 
43. Pitcher, M. A. 1998. Disruption without transformation: agrarian relations and livelihoods in 
Nampula province, Mozambique 1975–1995. Journal of Southern African Studies 24(1), 115-140. 
44. Rabobank. 2011. New Models of Farming in Argentina. Rabobank Industry Note. R. International. 
Amsterdam, Rabobank. 
45. Reardon, T., C. B. Barrett, J. A. Berdegué and J. F. M. Swinnen. 2009. Agrifood Industry 
Transformation and Small Farmers in Developing Countries. World Development 37(11), 1717-
1727. 
46. Schut, M., M. Slingerland and A. Locke. 2010. Biofuel developments in Mozambique. Update and 
analysis of policy, potential and reality. Energy Policy 38(9), 5151-5165. 
47. Vermeulen, S. and L. Cotula. 2010. Making the most of agricultural investment: A survey of 
business models that provide opportunities for smallholders. London/Rome/Bern: 
IIED/FAO/IFAD/SDC. 
48. Williamson, O. E. 1991. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural 
alternatives. Administrative science quarterly 36(2), 269-296. 
49. Woodhouse, P. 2012. New investment, old challenges. Land deals and the water constraint in 
African agriculture. Journal of Peasant Studies 39(3-4), 777-794. 
50. Zoomers, A. 2010. Globalisation and the foreignisation of space: seven processes driving the 
current global land grab. The Journal of Peasant Studies 37(2), 429-447. 
   Land Deal Politics Initiative 
 
 LDPI Working Paper Series 
A convergence of factors has been driving a revaluation of land by 
powerful economic and political actors. This is occurring across the world, 
but especially in the global South. As a result, we see unfolding worldwide 
a dramatic rise in the extent of cross-border, transnational corporation-
driven and, in some cases, foreign government-driven, large-scale land 
deals. The phrase ‘global land grab’ has become a catch-all phrase to 
describe this explosion of (trans)national commercial land transactions 
revolving around the production and sale of food and biofuels, 
conservation and mining activities.  
  
The Land Deal Politics Initiative launched in 2010 as an ‘engaged research’ 
initiative, taking the side of the rural poor, but based on solid evidence and 
detailed, field-based research. The LDPI promotes in-depth and systematic 
enquiry to inform deeper, meaningful and productive debates about the 
global trends and local manifestations. The LDPI aims for a broad 
framework encompassing the political economy, political ecology and 
political sociology of land deals centred on food, biofuels, minerals and 
conservation. Working within the broad analytical lenses of these three 
fields, the LDPI uses as a general framework the four key questions in 
agrarian political economy: (i) who owns what? (ii) who does what? (iii) 
who gets what? and (iv) what do they do with the surplus wealth created? 
Two additional key questions highlight political dynamics between groups 
and social classes: ‘what do they do to each other?’, and ‘how do changes 
in politics get shaped by dynamic ecologies, and vice versa?’ The LDPI 
network explores a range of big picture questions through detailed in-
depth case studies in several sites globally, focusing on the politics of land 
deals. 
 
Unraveling “land grabbing”: Different models of 
large-scale land acquisition in Southern Africa 
Since much of the focus on large-scale land acquisitions is predominantly 
political and ideological, different models and practices embedded in the 
phenomenon and, by consequence the diverse implications they imply, 
tend to be overlooked. This is supported by the use of the term “land 
grabbing”: while it implies large differences in forms of organization of the 
production, investment processes and outcomes these land deals might 
take, the existing body of literature misses the economic and institutional 
nuances of investment models embedded in “land grabbing”. The objective 
of this paper is to present the diversity of investment models implemented 
in Southern Africa and to analyze their differentiated implications in the 
framework of the region’s broader agrarian trajectories. Based on intensive 
empirical research in Southern Africa and using a theoretical framework 
based on institutional economics (focusing on the institutionalized forms of 
agricultural production, the investment implementation processes and the 
extent of the implications), the results show that beyond the classical 
institutionalized forms of agricultural production (independent commercial 
farming, estate farming) new investment and production models are 
developing in the region. Six models with several sub-models have been 
identified: independent farmers (independent farmers, delocalized 
auxiliary farm model, Resource pooling farmers), cooperative, 1,000-day 
speculative, asset management, contracting (nucleus-estate, reverse 
tenancy, ingrower schemes) and agribusiness models. Besides the lack of 
inclusive business models, another important commonality of these 
models is the high failure of the investments – unless strongly integrated 
structures and value-chains are developed – leading to the establishment 
of few corporate structures. The paper reflects on Southern Africa’s 
agrarian transformations, which, although not broad-based, are mainly 
characterized by the imposition of a dominant corporate-based paradigm. 
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